Ok, I admit it - it is slowly becoming pick on Phil Hellmuth day. That's alright, he's tough - I know he can take it. In a recent article Phil wrote, I found a very questionable play I'd like to discuss. Had anyone else in the world played this hand the way Phil did, you have to know he would be the first to jump all over them. Yet when he plays it out this way, the other player still manages to somehow be at fault. Interesting, to say the least.

Excerpts from his article are in bold italics. My thoughts in regular type:

I was off to a fast start when I raised it up with A-4, the flop came down 4-4-4, and someone moved all-in on me with A-J high! We started the event with $10,000 in chips, and I was immediately up to $30,000 in chips. That's a pretty agreeable way to start.

Phil is usually the first one to reprimand anyone who plays hands such as A4, yet he seems to have no trouble raising a pot with it himself. That aside, beautiful hand Phil. Can't ask for much more than that.

Then I ran into Mark "I Can't Help It" Seif. Lately, Seif cannot help but win poker tournaments, including an amazing two World Series of Poker tournaments in 2005. He has no fear (as the following hand will show), and a lot of talent.

It is surprising to hear Phil give someone else credit - simply not a part of his usual MO, though if anyone deserves it, Mark Seif certainly does based on his tournament performances over the past few years.

With the blinds at $50-$100, Seif called the $100 bet with Ah-5h, I raised it up to $500 to go with Ac-Qc, everyone else folded, and then Seif reraised to $1,200 to go. At that point I felt Seif was weak, but what should I do? Reraise him all-in for his last $12,000? Reraise him roughly $2,500 (the size of the pot), or call the $700 reraise? The least risky play seemed to be to call.

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       Though I do (in most cases) agree with calling here when holding AQ, I have to question Phil's logic about the hand. This is certainly debatable, but I think that if he believes Seif is truly weak why would he be looking for the least risky play in this position?

My call looked genius when the flop came down Qh-10c-5s. Seif now had only two wins in the deck! He checked, and I checked (to further trap him, and to protect myself from losing $12,000 in case he had me beat).

Hellmuth comments that Seif only has two wins in the deck. Well, not really. Either of the two remaining fives on the turn would give Seif trips, granted, but would not guarantee (by cards alone) a win or loss for either of them until the river card. Also, Seif still has a chance to catch a runner-runner nut flush - same as Hellmuth.

The second part of his statement just doesn't make sense. Are you trapping him, or are you protecting yourself, Phil? What seems obvious to me is that Phil has no idea where Seif is in this hand, and is playing scared. In this situation, I would either toss out a feeler bet to see how Seif responds and try to get a further read on him, or raise a larger amount in the attempt to take down the pot then and there. The last thing I would do is let him draw another card for free, yet that is what Hellmuth does.

The next card was the 2h, and now Seif bet out $2,500. Again, I had options: raise all-in, raise big like $6,000, or call. Once again, the safest option seemed to be a call.

Again, this makes no sense to me. Seif made a pot-sized bet, and Phil is still looking for the safest option. If you felt you were beat at this point (which Hellmuth isn't and doesn't seem to believe) you would get out of the hand. If you are confident that you are the favorite, why are you looking for a safe option here? If he did believe he was the favorite with top-pair, ace kicker, he should be getting as many chips into the pot as possible. Why let Seif draw again by simply calling, especially with a flush draw on the board? Either raise him out of the hand now or at the very least make him pay a high price for the right to draw. Calling here accomplishes nothing but allowing Seif the chance to win the hand.

The last card was the 5c, and Seif bet out $5,000. Knowing that it was possible that he could have a five, I paused, but still, all-in-all, I chose to call, very quickly. When he showed me his hand, I hit the roof! Yes, he had picked up a flush draw on fourth street, but his reraise before the flop was just plain reckless, especially against me (since I read people pretty well).

Phil is known to be outstanding at reading players - but he did everything except read Seif well here. He played the hand poorly on every street with the arguable exception of the initial deal - yet he still blows a gasket in what I am sure was true Hellmuthian fashion when Seif wins. 

Still, Seif's tricky reraise before the flop shows some guile, and the ability to mix it up. An hour later, I did get even with him when my pocket aces beat his K-10 on a board of 10-10-5-A-Q.

I find his choice of words here interesting. Guile? Guile, by definition, means treacherous cunning or skillful deceit. I don't think it was anything quite that dramatic. I'm guessing Seif either felt Hellmuth was weak, or simply wanted to play with him - or his mind. (Think implied tilt odds.) As far as Seif having the ability to 'mix it up', that is pretty much expected from any profitable, professional poker player - which Seif is. Very few players (I daresay select amateurs, only) would rely solely on playing the 'Top Ten Hands' that Phil so strongly encourages everyone to do, based on his book.

Though he didn't exactly call this a bad beat, I'm pretty sure he took it as one - otherwise why would it be discussed in such great detail? Strong hands played weak almost always get outplayed or outdrawn. I just can't seem to determine why he chose to play this hand the way he did. I'd love to hear Mark Seif's thought process throughout this hand.